refactor(tools): keep exec enable without configurable deny patterns
Made-with: Cursor
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@@ -1165,7 +1165,6 @@ MCP tools are automatically discovered and registered on startup. The LLM can us
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| `tools.restrictToWorkspace` | `false` | When `true`, restricts **all** agent tools (shell, file read/write/edit, list) to the workspace directory. Prevents path traversal and out-of-scope access. |
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| `tools.exec.enable` | `true` | When `false`, the shell `exec` tool is not registered at all. Use this to completely disable shell command execution. |
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| `tools.exec.pathAppend` | `""` | Extra directories to append to `PATH` when running shell commands (e.g. `/usr/sbin` for `ufw`). |
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| `tools.exec.denyPatterns` | `null` | Optional regex blacklist for shell commands. Set this to override the default dangerous-command patterns used by `exec`. |
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| `channels.*.allowFrom` | `[]` (deny all) | Whitelist of user IDs. Empty denies all; use `["*"]` to allow everyone. |
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@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ class AgentLoop:
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timeout=self.exec_config.timeout,
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restrict_to_workspace=self.restrict_to_workspace,
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path_append=self.exec_config.path_append,
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deny_patterns=self.exec_config.deny_patterns,
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))
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self.tools.register(WebSearchTool(config=self.web_search_config, proxy=self.web_proxy))
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self.tools.register(WebFetchTool(proxy=self.web_proxy))
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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
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):
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self.timeout = timeout
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self.working_dir = working_dir
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self.deny_patterns = deny_patterns if deny_patterns is not None else [
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self.deny_patterns = deny_patterns or [
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r"\brm\s+-[rf]{1,2}\b", # rm -r, rm -rf, rm -fr
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r"\bdel\s+/[fq]\b", # del /f, del /q
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r"\brmdir\s+/s\b", # rmdir /s
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@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ class ExecToolConfig(Base):
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enable: bool = True
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timeout: int = 60
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path_append: str = ""
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deny_patterns: list[str] | None = None
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class MCPServerConfig(Base):
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"""MCP server connection configuration (stdio or HTTP)."""
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@@ -97,16 +97,6 @@ class TestDispatch:
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assert loop.tools.get("exec") is None
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def test_exec_tool_receives_custom_deny_patterns(self):
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from nanobot.agent.tools.shell import ExecTool
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from nanobot.config.schema import ExecToolConfig
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loop, _bus = _make_loop(exec_config=ExecToolConfig(deny_patterns=[r"\becho\b"]))
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tool = loop.tools.get("exec")
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assert isinstance(tool, ExecTool)
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assert tool.deny_patterns == [r"\becho\b"]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_dispatch_processes_and_publishes(self):
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from nanobot.bus.events import InboundMessage, OutboundMessage
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@@ -134,12 +134,6 @@ def test_exec_guard_blocks_quoted_home_path_outside_workspace(tmp_path) -> None:
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assert error == "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
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def test_exec_empty_deny_patterns_override_defaults() -> None:
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tool = ExecTool(deny_patterns=[])
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error = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/demo", "/tmp")
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assert error is None
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# --- cast_params tests ---
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